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PREVENTIVE DETENTION: LIBERTY IN THE BALANCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Bail Reform Act of 19841 effected a radical change in federal bail jurisprudence.2 From the enactment of the first Judiciary
Act in 1789 until October 12, 1984, the date on which the Bail Reform Act took effect,' it was generally true that federal defendants in
noncapital cases could be admitted to bail.4 Under the new law, the
government may detain federal defendants prior to trial solely on
the ground that they represent a danger to the community. 5
Barely more than a decade ago, the constitutionality of such a
measure was a matter of serious dispute. 6 But a number of recent
decisions provide a legal framework for the argument that preventive detention is constitutional. In Bell v. Wolfish 7 the United States
Supreme Court distinguished conditions of pretrial detention that
are merely regulatory, and hence constitutional, from those that are
punitive, and hence unconstitutional. 8 In United States v. Edwards9
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected eighth amendment' and due process challenges to a statute that authorized preventive detention." In Schall v. Martin 12 the Supreme Court upheld
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. 1, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141-3150 and scattered other sections of Titles 18 and 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985)).
2. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1009 (2d Cir. 1986) (Feinberg,
C.J., concurring); United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 392 (3d Cir. 1986) (Sloviter,
J., dissenting).
3. Abramovsky & Chikofsky, Second Circuit's Hard Look at Preventive Detention,
N.Y.LJ., May 27, 1986, at 1, col. 3, at 5, col. 1.
4. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321,
1326 n.6 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 33,
1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789); Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3146(a), 80 Stat.
214 (1966).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
6. Compare, e.g., Ervin, Foreword: Preventive Detention-A Step Backwardfor CriminalJustice, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291 (1971) (arguing that preventive detention is unconstitutional); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: PreventiveJustice in the World ofJohn Mitchell, 56 VA.
L. REV. 371 (1970) (same) with Meyer, Constitutionalityof PretrialDetention, 60 CEO. L. J.
1382 (1972) (arguing that preventive detention is constitutional); Mitchell, Bail Reform
and the Constitutionality of PretrialDetention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969) (same).
7. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
8. Id. at 535-39. The Court expressly avoided the issue of the constitutionality of
preventive detention. Id. at 534 n.15.
9. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required.
11. 430 A.2d at 1325-41. Congress had enacted the statute, D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-
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New York's scheme for preventive detention ofjuvenile offenders. '3
In finding the new Act constitutional, many federal courts have also
drawn an analogy to decisions that have upheld civil commitment of
persons who are dangerous and either insane or mentally
incompetent.'

4

This comment will analyze the Bail Reform Act of 1984. It will
examine whether the recent detention cases were decided correctly
and whether they do in fact support the constitutionality of preventive detention.
The great majority of courts, including the United States
Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, have concluded that the Bail Reform Act is, at least, not unconstitutional on its face.' 5 But even some of these courts have
cautioned that one of the Act's most troublesome features-the possibility of indefinite pretrial detention16may in some circumstances render it unconstitutional as applied.' 7
1322 (1973), in 1970 in connection with the Nixon administration's "law and order"
campaign. See Mitchell, supra note 6.
12. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
13. Id. at 256-57. Both Schall and Edwards relied in part on Wolfish. 467 U.S. at 26971; 430 A.2d at 1331-33.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 548-49 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 112-13 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986); United
States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1450 (N.D. Ill. 1984). The cases on which these
courts have relied include Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Greenwood v.
United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956); and Minnesota ex rel Pearson v. Probate Court, 309
U.S. 270 (1940). See infra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
15. United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 1102, 1103 (11 th Cir. 1986); Zannino, 798
F.2d at 546-47; Perry, 788 F.2d at 109-18; United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 766-68
(7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 387-88 (3d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Simmons, 643 F. Supp. 290, 292-93 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United States v. Knight,
636 F. Supp. 1462, 1469 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp.
1283, 1286-93 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Kouyoumdjian, 601 F. Supp. 1506,
1511 (C.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 505-07
(D.P.R. 1984), aft'd, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985); Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. at 1448-53.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 65-78.
17. Zannino, 798 F.2d at 546-49; United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 78-79 (2d
Cir.) (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986); United States v.
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1007-09 (2d Cir. 1986) (Feinberg, CJ., concurring);
Portes, 786 F.2d at 768; Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 388; Knight, 636 F. Supp. at 1469 n.6;
United States v. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324, 1325-26 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), stay denied, 620
F. Supp. 1327, appeal dismissed sub noma.United States v. Cheeseman, 783 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.
1986); Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. at 1451 n.5; cf. United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d
334, 343 (2d Cir. 1986) (detention for more than 14 months on the ground of
probability of flight would violate due process); United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510,
1516 (10th Cir. 1986) (detention for more than five months on the ground of probability
of flight would violate due process). But cf. United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d
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The Second Circuit alone has found the Act facially unconstitutional. I" That court spoke first through a divided panel in United
States v. Melendez-Carrion.19 In that case, the defendants, a band of
Puerto Rican nationalists known as Los Macheteros,2' had been in detention for over eight months. 2' Because of the large number of defendants and the broad scope of pretrial discovery, the defendants
would not have faced trial for two to three years.2 2
In his opinion for the court, Judge Newman eloquently declared that pretrial detention based on a prediction of future criminality violated the substantive guarantee of liberty embodied in the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. 23 Chief Judge Feinberg
did not agree that preventive detention was inherently unconstitutional.2 4 Nonetheless, he found that on the facts of Melendez-Carrion
detention had degenerated into punishment and had, therefore, become unconstitutional.2 5 In dissent, Judge Timbers contended that
preventive detention, even of indefinite duration, was a valid con246, 252-53 (2d Cir.) (detention for more than eight months on the ground of
probability of flight did not violate due process), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 562 (1986).
18. United States v. Romano, 799 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Frisone, 795 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1986); Salerno, 794 F.2d at 71-75; Melendez-Carrion, 790
F.2d at 1000-04; id. at 1007-09 (Feinberg, CJ., concurring); LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. at
1325-26.
19. 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986). In United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 100-01
(2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit had initially dodged the constitutional question.
20. In English "Los Macheteros" means "The Machete Wielders." 790 F.2d at 989.
21. Id. at 1006 (Feinberg, CJ., concurring). The defendants were held on charges
arising out of the September 12, 1983, robbery of a Wells Fargo office in West Hartford,
Connecticut. Id. at 988 (opinion of the court).
22. See id. at 1006 (Feinberg, CJ., concurring).
23. Id. at 1000-04 (opinion of Newman, J.).
24. Id. at 1005-07 (Feinberg, CJ., concurring). Relying on Wolfish and Schall, Chief
Judge Feinberg concluded that preventive detention served constitutional regulatory
ends. With the passage of time, however, detention could degenerate into punishment.
Id. at 1007-09. For other authorities that support this proposition, see supra note 17.
25. 790 F.2d at 1007-09. The Second Circuit's order did not immediately result in
freedom for the Melendez-Carrion defendants. First, the order applied only to the two
defendants--Gonzales Claudio and Camacho-Negron-who were being held solely on
the grounds of dangerousness; the other seven defendants, who were being held on the
ground of risk of flight and, in several cases, dangerousness as well, gained nothing. Id.
at 1005 (opinion of Newman, J.). In addition, on remand the district judge revised his
prior findings and ordered Gonzales Claudio and Camacho-Negron detained on a new
ground: risk of flight. United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 336 (2d Cir.
1986). The Supreme Court refused to intercede. Melendez-Carrion v. United States,
107 S. Ct. 18 (1986). Finally, in November 1986, the Second Circuit ordered the release
of Gonzales Claudio and Camacho-Negron, holding that pretrial detention for 15
months on the ground of risk of flight violated due process. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d at
343; cf. Theron, 782 F.2d at 1516 (detention for more than five months on the ground of
probability of flight would violate due process). On December 3, 1986, the district
judge set bail not only for Gonzales Claudio and Camacho-Negron, but also for their
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gressional response to the problem of violent crimes committed by
persons released on bail.2 6
In United States v. Salerno2 7 the Second Circuit clarified its position on preventive detention by adopting the view of Judge Newman: such a restriction, on its face, denies substantive due
process.28 Salerno's situation was not as compelling as that of the
Melendez-Carrion defendants, since he had been in detention for a
mere three months.2 9 Thus, ChiefJudge Feinberg, applying his duration test from Melendez-Carrion, maintained that the detention had
not yet lost its regulatory character.30 But the majority held that
preventive detention of any duration is unconstitutional.3 ' The
Supreme Court has agreed to hear the Salerno appeal, 2 and may
seven codefendants. Bail Is Orderedfor Nine "Terrorists," Nat'l L.J., Dec. 22, 1986, at 14,
col. 1.
26. 790 F.2d at 1011-15 (Timbers, J., dissenting). Judge Timbers characterized preventive detention as a purely regulatory and, therefore, constitutional measure. See id.
27. 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986).
28. Id. at 71-75. AlthoughJudge Newman was also a member of the Salerno majority,
Judge Kearse authored the opinion of the court. That opinion, however, incorporates by
reference much of the reasoning of Judge Newman's opinion in Melendez-Carrion. See
Salerno, 794 F.2d at 72-74. Thus, the validity of the result in Salerno is largely dependent
on the validity of the conclusions expressed in the lead opinion in Melendez-Carrion.
29. Id. at 79 (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting). The Salerno case thus forced the court to
decide whether preventive detention was unconstitutional per se, or whether it would
become unconstitutional only if the passage of time caused it to lose its regulatory
character.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 71.
32. 107 S. Ct. 387 (1986). Note, however, that on November 19, 1986, in the socalled Mafia Commission trial, a federal jury in Manhattan convicted Salerno and seven
codefendants on numerous counts of extortion and racketeering. Eight Crime Bosses Convicted, Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1986, at A3, col. 1. The Salerno case, therefore, now seems
moot: the government had contended only that the Constitution did not require Salerno's release prior to his conviction. Still, the Court might seek to entertain the case
under the exception to the mootness doctrine for controversies "capable of repetition,
but evading review." See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) and authorities cited
therein. However, the Bail Reform Act authorized indefinite pretrial detention; therefore, many controversies will endure sufficiently long to permit Supreme Court review.
Consider, for example, that the Melendez-Carrion defendants spent 15 months in detention before a federal district judge ordered their release. Bail Is Orderedfor Nine "Terrorists," Nat'l LJ., Dec. 22, 1986, at 14, col. 1.
Nevertheless, because of the strength of the government's case, the Court may be
reluctant to relinguish the opportunity to decide Salerno. In Salerno, for example, the
Court need not confront the difficult issue of the constitutionality of indefinite pretrial
detention, the defendants' having been detained a mere three months; Salerno himself,
the longtime don of one of the nation's leading crime families, is clearly the sort of
"dangerous" defendant against whom Congress expected the Act to apply; and, finally,
the conviction, by ratifying the pretrial finding of dangerousness, may militate indirectly
in favor of reversal.
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soon determine the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act.3 3
II.

HISTORY

Before the Bail Reform Act became law, judicial officers setting
bail could not legitimately consider predictions of future criminality.
Federal defendants would be admitted to bail except in three circumstances: (1) they were charged with a capital offense; 34 (2) they
were exceedingly likely to flee; 35 or (3) they had threatened witnesses or jurors.3 6
The first two exceptions were closely related. Capital defendants were not refused bail on the ground that, if released, they were
likely to endanger the safety of the community.3 7 Historically, many
offenses that carried the death penalty were not dangerous to the
community at large. 38 The majority of courts and commentators
have suggested that capital defendants were simply thought more
likely than ordinary defendants to flee in order to avoid prosecution.3 9 As one court stated: "In a choice between hazarding his life
before a jury and forfeiting his or his sureties' property, the framers
of the Constitution obviously reacted to man's undoubted urge to
33. See Lauter, How Sharp to the Right Might the Court Veer, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 6, 1986, at
10, col. 2; Thompson, Showdown on Preventive Detention, Daily Record (Baltimore, Md.),
Aug. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 2; Murphy, Law Allowing Denial of Bail Provokes Debate on Rights,
The Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1986, at Al, col. 5, at A12, col. 6.
34. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321,
1326 n.6 (D.C. 1981); Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3146(a), 80 Stat.
214 (1966); Judiciary Act of 1789, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789).
35. See United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1002 (2d Cir. 1986) and
authorities cited therein; United States v. Abrahams, 527 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 821 (1978).
36. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 667-68 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1962)
(denial of bail pending appeal); Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 643-44
(Harlan, Circuit Justice 1961) (denial of bail during trial); United States v. Payden, 768
F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1985) (denial of bail prior to trial); United States v. Wind, 527
F.2d 672, 675 (6th Cir. 1975) (denial of bail prior to trial); United States v. Gilbert, 425
F.2d 490, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (denial of bail during trial).
37. Tribe, supra note 6, at 377. But cf.Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1225 (concluding that
"anticipated danger to other persons or the community was a substantial motivating
factor in legislative decisions to make bail unavailable to certain classes of dangerous
offenders").
38. For example, forgery, sodomy, and horse theft historically carried the death penalty. While these types of crimes might pose some danger to the immediate victim, they
do not threaten the physical safety of a large portion of society. See Melendez-Carrion, 790
F.2d at 997-98 and authorities cited therein; Tribe, supra note 6, at 377-78.
39. In essence, the capital defendant exception was a corollary of the second exception: capital defendants were deemed per se likely to flee.
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prefer the latter. "40
The underlying justifications for withholding bail-prevention
of flight and protection of witnesses and jurors-do not serve to
protect the safety of the general community. Rather, their purpose
is to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. 4 ' The use of bail
to secure a defendant's presence at trial merely enables society to
bring malefactors to justice.4 2 Withholding bail in order to protect
witnesses and jurors does protect certain members of the community from physical danger. The protection afforded the community,
though, is philosophical rather than physical: it ensures that the
trial society demands will be a fair one.4 3
Only after conviction, when a defendant sought freedom pending appeal, did courts ever examine whether the defendant's release
might pose a threat to the safety of the community.4 4 But some cautioned against considering dangerousness even in this circumstance.
For example, Justice Black wrote:
The idea that it would be "dangerous" in general to
allow the applicant to be at large must-if it is ever ajustifiable ground for denying bail as distinguished from a separate proceeding for a bond to keep the peace-relate to
some kind of danger that so jeopardizes the public that the
only way to45protect against it would be to keep the applicant in jail.
Similarly, Justice Jackson, writing for the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, stated: "Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this
country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I
am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial
technique ...."146
40. State v. Konigsberg, 33 NJ. 367, 373, 164 A.2d 740, 743 (1960) (citing State v.
Williams, 30 N.J. 105, 125, 152 A.2d 9, 19 (1959)).
41. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1002.
42. Id.; Tribe, supra note 6, at 397.
43. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1002.
44. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 666 & n.4 (Douglas, Circuit Justice
1962) and authorities cited therein; Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
45. Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38 (1968) (Black, Circuit Justice). For a
discussion ofJustice Black's alternative remedy, the peace bond, see Tribe, supra note 6,
at 394 n.94, 402 & n.137.
46. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282-83 (Jackson, Circuit Justice
1950). It is remarkable that both the Sellers and the Williamson decisions came at moments of grave national crisis. Sellers, a black militant opposed to the Vietnam War, had
been convicted of "refusing to submit to induction into the armed services." 89 S.Ct. at

384

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 46:378

Some critics contend that judges have always considered dangerousness, without admitting as much. They claim that judges,
when confronted with a particularly violent defendant, would set excessively high bail on the pretense that the defendant was unlikely to
appear at trial.4 7 Yet even if this claim were true, the law ought not
to be changed in order to legitimize past misdeeds.4 8
III.

THE ACT

Section 3142(e) of the Bail Reform Act 49 expressly empowers

the judiciary to deny bail on the basis of predictions of future
criminality:
If... the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance
of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the
person prior to trial. 5"
Section 3142(g) instructs judges and magistrates in the art of evaluating threats to community safety. The judicial officer should consider, among other factors: "the nature and circumstances of the
offense charged"; 5 ' "the weight of the evidence against the person";5 2 indicia of the defendant's past, such as ties to the community, employment record, and history of drug or alcohol abuse; and
whether the government brought the current charges while the defendant was on bail, probation, or parole.5 3 The subsection includes the seemingly tautological instruction to consider "the
nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the commu38. The Willianson defendants, writers for the Communist Party newspaper The Daily
Worker, had been convicted of Smith Act violations arising out of their opposition to the
Korean War. 184 F.2d at 283.
47. S.REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3193; 130 CONG. REC. S946 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (remarks of Sen.
Hatch); see Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1012 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
48. It appears that Congress intended the Act to permit greater access to bail by
deterring judges from setting high money bonds. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3191-92; see also 18
U.S.C. § 3142(c) (Supp. III 1985) (judicial officer may not impose a financial condition
that results in a person's pretrial detention). That attempt, however, appears to have
failed: a preliminary report from the General Accounting Office suggests that many defendants are still unable to make bail. Murphy, Law Allowing Denial of Bail Provokes Debate
on Rights, The Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1986, at Al, col. 5, at A12, col. 5.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985).
50. Id.
51. Id. at § 3142(g)(1).

52. Id. at § 3142(g)(2).
53. See id. at § 3142(g)(3)(A)-(B).
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'5
nity that would be posed by the person's release." "
The Act also establishes two rebuttable presumptions of dangerousness. One presumption arises if a judge or magistrate finds
probable cause to believe that the defendant either has committed
an offense under the federal narcotics laws that is punishable by at
least ten years imprisonment, 55 or has used or unlawfully carried a
firearm during the commission of a crime of violence.5 6
Sections 3142(e) and 3142(f) together set forth the complex
formula for a second presumption. Briefly stated, defendants are
rebuttably presumed dangerous if: they have been convicted, within
the last five years, of a crime of violence, an offense punishable by
life imprisonment or death, or a major drug offense; they are currently before the court on similar charges; and they are alleged to
have committed the offenses with which they are presently charged
while on release pending trial. 7
Section 3142(e) provides that a hearing must take place prior to
detention.58 Section 3142(f) establishes the procedure for these
"detention hearings. ' '59 Defendants have the right to counsel, to
testify on their own behalf, to call and to cross-examine witnesses,
and to place other evidence in the record. 60 Hearsay evidence is ad61
missible at the hearing.
These statutory safeguards are adequate, if not elaborate; every
court that has considered this issue has held that the Act affords
procedural due process.6 2 In fact, in Schall v. Martin6 3 the Supreme

54. Id. at § 31 4 2(g)(4).
55. Id. at § 3142(e). See Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title II, 84
Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-02 and scattered other sections of Titles 18, 21, & 42 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title III, 84 Stat. 1285 (1970) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-66 and scattered other sections and titles of the United
States Code (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). In United States v. Romano, 799 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.
1986) (per curiam), the court held that this presumption violated substantive due process. Id. at 18.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). See id. at § 924(c) (Supp. III 1985).
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e)-(f) (Supp. III 1985).
58. Id. at § 3142(e).
59. Id. at § 3142(0.
60. Id.
61. Id. Some courts and commentators have found the admissibility of hearsay to be
particularly troubling. See, e.g., United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 395 (3d Cir.
1985) (Sloviter,J. dissenting); Ervin, supra note 6, at 298. For example, prosecutors can
preclude the right to cross-examination if they present the affidavits of government witnesses, rather than the witnesses themselves. Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 395 (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting).
62. See, e.g.,
United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 113-16 (3d Cir. 1986); United
States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp.
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Court upheld a New York statute that authorized preventive detention of juveniles, although the statute's procedural safeguards were
64
substantially fewer than those of the Bail Reform Act.
Perhaps the most unique, and most troublesome, feature of the
Act is its failure to specify any upper limit for the period of detention.6 ' The statute that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
found constitutional in United States v. Edwards6 6 specified that detention could last no longer than sixty days. 6 7 Similarly, New York's
statutory scheme for preventive detention of juveniles, which the
Supreme Court upheld in Schall, authorized at most seventeen days
in detention. 6 8 If a criminal defendant is held interminably, the "detention" takes on the appearance of a de facto jail sentence.
Congress intended that the Speedy Trial Act 69 would limit the
length of pretrial detention." Section 3164 of the Speedy Trial Act
states that pretrial detainees must come to trial within ninety days
after detention begins.7 1 Unfortunately, the "days" to which that
section refers are not calendar days. Section 3161(h) contains numerous provisions for "excludable time" that does not count
72
against the ninety-day requirement.
1283, 1291-93 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1452
(N.D. Ill. 1984); cf. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1333-41 (D.C. 1981) (upholding the constitutionality of analogous procedures under the District of Columbia's
preventive detention statute). Notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist's insistence in Schall
v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278-79 (1984), that dangerousness is judicially discernible,
other indications suggest that the courts have met with serious difficulties in making
such determinations. Riley, Preventive Detention Use Grows-But Is It Fair?, Nat'l L.J., Mar.
24, 1986, at 1, col. 1, at 33, cols. 1-2.
63. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
64. See id. at 274-80. For an excellent description of the inadequacy of the procedures at issue in Schall, see id. at 283-86, 303-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Note, however, that the liberty interest of juveniles is not as strong as that of adults. Under the
three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), therefore, the
government may use less elaborate procedures in effecting preventive detention of
juveniles. See 467 U.S. at 275-81.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985). This feature has evoked expressions of
concern from nearly every court that has considered the Act. See infra note 78 and authorities cited therein.
66. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
67. Id. at 1323; D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(2)(a) (1981). For some crimes, the
maximum period of detention under the District of Columbia statute is now 90 days.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1986).
68. See 467 U.S. at 270; N.Y. JUD. LAw §§ 320.5, 340.1 (McKinney 1983).
69. 18 U.S.C. 88 3161-74, 3152-56 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
70. See 130 CONG. REC. S941 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (statements of Sen. Specter); id.
(statements of Sen. Thurmond); id. at S943 (statements of Sen. Laxalt).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
72. See id. at § 3161(h).
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A trial judge may grant excludable time if, inter alia, the defendant undergoes physical or mental examinations, pursues an interlocutory appeal, or faces trial in the interim on other charges.73 The
potential for delay is greatest, however, in complex cases, especially
those involving numerous defendants. In such cases, in order to
serve "the ends of justice, ' 74 the trial judge is often compelled to
grant a continuance to one or both of the parties. 75 These continuances do not count against the Speedy Trial Act's ninety-day time
limit. 76 Yet the period of excludable delay may last for months, or
even years.7 7 As a result, nearly every court that has considered the
constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act has held that, at least in
some cases, the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act may not adequately protect due process interests.78

73. See generally id. In United States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
rev'd, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1986), the trial court judge observed that, in addition to the
nine major grounds for excludable time set forth in § 3161(h), the court's standard form
for ordering excludable delay listed 30 reasons plus numerous additional subreasons.
616 F. Supp. at 786.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(h)(2)(8)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1006 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Feinberg, C.J., concurring); Colombo, 616 F. Supp. at 786-87.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(h) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
77. See, e.g., Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1006 (Feinberg, CJ., concurring) (two to
three years might pass before completion of defendants' trials); Colombo, 616 F.2d at 785
(13 months to two years might pass before completion of defendants' trials).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 547-48 (1st Cir. 1986); MelendezCarrion, 790 F.2d at 1007-09 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring); United States v. Portes, 786
F.2d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir.
1986); United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Knight, 636 F. Supp. 1462, 1469 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United States v. LoFranco, 620 F.
Supp. 1324, 1325-26 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. Cheeseman, 783 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1451 n.6
(N.D. Ill. 1984); cf. United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 343 (2d Cir. 1986)
(detention of more than 14 months on ground of probability of flight would violate due
process); United States v.Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246, 251-53 (2d Cir. 1986) (continued detention for over eight months on ground of probability of flight might eventually
give rise to due process concerns); United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1516 (10th
Cir. 1986) (detention for more than five months on the ground of probability of flight
would violate due process). But see Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1014 (Timbers, J., dissenting); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (time limits
of Speedy Trial Act adequately protect detainees' due process rights); United States v.
Kouyoumdjian, 601 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (time limits of Speedy Trial
Act are "sufficient to ensure that the defendant's due process rights are compromised to
the least extent practicable"); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 505
(D.P.R. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985) (time limits of Speedy Trial Act eliminate due process concerns).
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CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Three cases shape the analysis of the Bail Reform Act's constitutionality: Bell v. Wolfish, 7 9 United States v. Edwards,8" and Schall v.
Martin.8 Wolfish and Edwards, which were both decided before the
Senate Judiciary Committee drafted the Act, figured prominently in
the congressional debate over the Act's constitutionality.8 2 Schall,
which the Supreme Court decided after the bill had been drafted
but before it became law, directly confronts the issue of preventive
detention, albeit in the context of juvenile offenders.8 3
A.

Bell v. Wolfish

In Bell v. Wolfsh 8 4 the United States Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of certain draconian conditions of pretrial detention, 8 5 not the constitutional preconditions for detention itself.8 6
In a startling passage, however, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, purported to abolish the presumption of innocence, except insofar as it pertains to criminal trial procedure:
The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials; it also may
serve as an admonishment to the jury to judge an accused's
guilt or innocence solely on the evidence adduced at trial
and not on the basis of suspicions that may arise from the
fact of his arrest, indictment, or custody, or from other
matters not introduced as proof at trial. It is "an inaccurate, shorthand description of the right of the accused to
'remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution has taken
up its burden and produced evidence and effected persuasion; . . .' an 'assumption' that is indulged in the absence of
contrary evidence." Without question, the presumption of
innocence plays an important role in our criminal justice
79. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
80. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
81. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
82. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3190-91.
83. 467 U.S. at 264-80.
84. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
85. The Court upheld, inter alia, body cavity searches that were conducted after every
occasion on which detainees had physical contact with visitors. Id. at 558-62.
86. See id. at 523-24. Technically, therefore, Wofish does not bear directly on the
issue of preventive detention. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 289 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1001 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986).
In fact, the Court in Wofish expressly declined to pass on the constitutionality of preventive detention. 441 U.S. at 534 n.15.
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system. "The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law." But
it has no application to a determination of the rights of a
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has
even begun.8 7
This passage has clear implications for the debate over the constitutionality of preventive detention. If it is incorrect to speak of criminal defendants as "presumptively innocent," except perhaps in
describing the allocation of the burden of proof at trial, then preventive detention might easily come to resemble a form of civil commitment, rather than incarceration.88
The language of the Bail Reform Act demonstrates Congress'
awareness of this aspect of Wolfish. Section 31420) states that nothing in the Act should be construed "as modifying or limiting the
presumption of innocence." '8 9 In the debates over the Act, however,
several Senators expressed concern that persons who were "presumptively innocent" might nonetheless be compelled to endure
lengthy periods of pretrial detention.9 0 The presumption of innocence, therefore, may yet provide guidance. Indeed, closer analysis
87. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 533 (citations omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S.
478, 484 n.12 (1978), and Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895), respectively). This was not dicta: both the trial court and the court of appeals had relied on
the presumption of innocence as the source of a constitutional right to be free of certain
burdensome conditions of confinement. Id. at 532. The Court's attempt to limit the
presumption in this way, however, flies in the face of statements to the contrary in several Supreme Court cases. See id. at 582-83 n.10 and authorities cited therein (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, in cases construing the Bail Reform Act, many courts have agreed that
Wolfish thus limits the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Cocco, 604 F.
Supp. 1060, 1061 (M.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501,
507 (D.P.R. 1984), aft'd, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazzard, 598 F.
Supp. 1442, 1449-50 (N.D. Ill. 1984). But see United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382,
396 (3d Cir. 1986) (SloviterJ., dissenting); United States v. Deitz, 629 F. Supp. 655, 656
(N.D.N.Y 1986) (detainees presumed innocent until they admit guilt); cf.Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 291 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (state statute authorizing pretrial
detention of juveniles conflicted with the presumption of innocence).
88. In fact, at least one court has attempted to characterize preventive detention as a
form of civil, rather than criminal, detention. United States v. Perry, 788 U.S. 100, 109
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 218 (1986).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 31420) (Supp. III 1985); see S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
25, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3208.
90. 130 CONG. REC. S939, S944 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (statements of Sen. Mitchell); id. at S940 (statements of Sen. Specter). These remarks concerned an unsuccessful
attempt to reduce the period of pretrial detention under the Speedy Trial Act from 90
days to 60 days.
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of Wofish suggests that the Court transformed, rather than obliterated, the presumption.
The Court distinguished between "punitive" and "regulatory"
conditions of confinement, holding that a detainee has a constitutional right to be free of punishment prior to an adjudication of
guilt.9 ' The source of this right was clearly the substantive guarantee of liberty embodied in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In its conclusion, the Court referred to each of the landmark
decisions in which it has held that constitutional liberty encompasses rights beyond those enumerated in positive sources of law
such as statutes, regulations, or the Constitution itself.9 2
This new constitutional right, however, proved illusory, for the
Court ignored language in its prior decisions in order to adopt a
restrictive definition of "punishment. ' 93 Justice Rehnquist initially
quoted Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,94 the case in which the Court
attempted to elaborate a constitutional definition of that term. The
Mendoza-Martinez Court stated that, absent evidence of express legislative intent to punish,9 5 the following factors would be significant:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing
directions.96
91. 441 U.S. at 535-36.
92. Id. at 580 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As authority for the newly discovered right,
the Court cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
The majority denied that it had identified a new, fundamental right, asserting that
"we leave prior decisional law as we find it." Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535 n.17. Does it
follow from this assertion that, under "prior decisional law," substantive due process
did not form the basis of the right to be free of punishment prior to an adjudication of
guilt? No. Instead, from the Court's assertion it follows only that, whatever its source,
this right predates the Wofish decision.
93. See 441 U.S. at 538-39.
94. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
95. For an example of express legislative intent to punish, see United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 308-12 (1946).
96. 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
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Despite the clear statement that the factors above "are all relevant,"Justice Rehnquist immediately discarded every aspect of Mendoza-Martinez except the "rational connection" factor-the easiest of
all to satisfy. He then proceeded to apply that factor alone as if it
were the entire test.9 7 The "alternative purpose" of institutional security was "rationally assignable" to practices such as body cavity
inspections. Those practices did not, therefore, constitute punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt. 98 Rather, the Court regarded
them as mere "regulatory restraints," which detainees were obliged
to suffer as an incident of detention. 99
Three dissenting justices condemned Justice Rehnquist's disingenuous reasoning. They recognized that the Court had, in effect,
employed a rational basis test to assess the alleged denial of a fundamental right.'0° Such an approach thoroughly devalues the constitutional safeguards for the detainees' liberty interests. "For," as
Justice Stevens stated, "governmental activity that affects even minor interests and is 'arbitrary and purposeless' is unconstitutional
whether or not it is punishment."' 0'1
An honest application of the Mendoza-Martinez test demonstrates that preventive detention does in fact constitute punishment.
Pretrial detention clearly involves an affirmative restraint on personal liberty.' 0 2 This is particularly so in light of the Wofish Court's
97. 441 U.S. at 538-39. In a footnote, the Court conceded that exceedingly harsh
conditions of detention might still constitute punishment even if the conditions were
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. Id. at 539-40 n.20. Thus, at
least one additional element of Mendoza-Martinez survived Wolfish. In fact, in practice the
lower courts have proceeded as though the entire Mendoza-Martinez test remains good
law. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1332 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1022 (1982).
98. 441 U.S. at 561-62. Employing this standard, the Court also upheld, inter alia,
the practice of housing two detainees in a cell designed for one; a rule that permitted
detainees to receive books or magazines only if a publisher or book club mailed the
materials directly to the institution; and a rule that permitted detainees to receive food
or personal property only at Christmas. See id. at 539-60.
99. See id. at 537.
100. Id. at 563-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 588, 589 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 584-85 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Note also that the Wolfish majority
placed on the detainees the "heavy burden" of demonstrating that the challenged conditions of detention were neither "rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose" nor "excessive in relation to that purpose." Id. at 561-62. Because Wofish turned
on the alleged denial of a fundamental constitutional right, however, it was plainly incorrect for the majority to allocate the burden in that manner. Instead, the Court should
have required the United States to demonstrate that a compelling governmental interest
justified the challenged conditions. See Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1369 (Mack, J., dissenting)
and authorities cited therein.
102. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1008 (2d Cir. 1986) (Feinberg,
C.J., concurring); Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1369 (Mack, J., dissenting).
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essentially laissez faire attitude toward restrictive conditions of institutional confinement.' 0 3 The Court's approval of body cavity
searches, even when executed upon the slightest suspicion, symbolizes the limitations on liberty and privacy that a detainee must
endure.
Preventive detention also serves two of the traditional aims of
punishment-deterrence and incapacitation. The threat of an indefinite period of detention prior to trial might reasonably constitute a
deterrent to crime. 10 4 Moreover, although the Court in MendozaMartinez did not include incapacitation in its brief list of "the traditional aims of punishment," it has since held that prevention of future crimes is an aspect of punishment:
It would be archaic to limit the definition of "punishment"
to "retribution." Punishment serves several purposes; retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive. One of
the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is
to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not
make imprisonment any the less punishment.10 5
In addition, incapacitation is technically a species of deterrence;
when incapacitated, one cannot commit a crime.'0 6 Hence, it may be
argued that Mendoza-Martinez did 10in7 fact recognize incapacitation as
a traditional aim of punishment.
Other considerations suggest that preventive detention constitutes punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt. Under the Bail
Reform Act, the government may detain a defendant only upon a
showing of scienter-that is, only if there is clear and convincing evidence of the defendant's propensity to commit violent, criminal acts
in the future.'0 8 Furthermore, detention itself, as well as its pur'09
poses, has "historically been regarded as punishment."'
103. See 441 U.S. at 562.
104. Indeed, it is remarkable that advocates of preventive detention seem not to advance this point.
105. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965), partly quoted in Melendez-Carrion,
790 F.2d at 999.
106. Incapacitation is referred to as "specific" as opposed to "general" deterrence.
Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1333 & n.30. It is really the best form of deterrence.
107. The Edwards court, however, rejected this argument. Id. at 1333.
108. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); United States v.
Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 77 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
397 (1986); see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985).
109. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168; see Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
237-38 (1896); Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426-29 (1885); Campbell v. McGruder,
580 F.2d 521, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("the conditions of pretrial imprisonment are virtually indistinguishable from those of punishment"); cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
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The Supreme Court, in Mendoza-Martinez, contemplated that
many of the factors it enumerated would point in different directions." 0 Yet, in the context of the Bail Reform Act, those factors
point almost uniformly toward a characterization of preventive detention as punishment.
B.

United States v. Edwards

In United States v. Edwards "' the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals considered and rejected numerous constitutional challenges to preventive detention." 2 In particular, the Edwards court
thoroughly and forcefully rejected the claim that the eighth amend3
ment establishes an absolute right to bail in all noncapital cases."1
Despite substantial scholarly support for the position that the constitution does confer such a right, 1 4 every court that has considered
an eighth amendment challenge to the Bail Reform Act has followed
Edwards. 15

The bail clause of the eighth amendment does not state that the
right to bail is absolute; instead it forbids only "excessive bail.""' 6
Yet one might argue that the absolute power to withhold bail is tantamount to the power to set bail so excessively high that no person
could buy his or her freedom.' 7 The Supreme Court has never
passed directly on this issue, but in two cases decided during the
October 1951 Term, the Court confused the matter by issuing conflicting dicta.
In Stack v. Boyle"' the Court wrote that:
(1951) ("This traditional right to freedom before conviction ... serves to prevent the
infliction of punishment prior to conviction.").
110. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.
111. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
112. The court thus upheld the statute that served as a prototype for the Bail Reform
Act.
113. 430 A.2d at 1325-41.
114. See, e.g., Ervin, supra note 6, at 298; Foote, The Coming ConstitutionalCrisis in Bail: 1,
113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 970-71 (1965); Tribe, supra note 6, at 398-406. But see Duker,
The Right to Bail: A HistoricalInquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33, 86-90 (1977); Meyer, supra note
6, at 1179-94; Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1224-25.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 996-98 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 562 (1986); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (N.D.
Cal. 1985); United States v. Kouyoumdjian, 601 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (C.D. Cal. 1985);
United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 506-07 (D.P.R. 1984), aft'd, 755
F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required .
117. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 996-97. But even the most liberal court, the Second
Circuit, has rejected this contention. See id.
118. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
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This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits
the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to
prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.
Unless this right to bail is preserved, the presumption of
innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would
lose its meaning." 9
But only four months later, in Carlson v. Landon, 2 ' the Court observed that:
The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has never
been thought to confer a right to bail in all cases, but
merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those
cases where it is proper to grant bail. 2 '
Favoring Stack over Carlson, a handful of courts had held that
the eighth amendment does confer an absolute right to bail.' 2 2 The
Edwards court, however, used the historical insight in Carlson as a
point of departure. 2 '
The court contended that the Framers were familiar with documents which, by their literal terms, established an absolute right to
bail. Yet, instead of using those documents, they lifted the bail
clause directly from the English Bill of Rights. 2' 4 The history of bail
119. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). This statement is dicta, because the Court held simply
that lower courts had set excessive bail for defendants charged with violations of the
Smith Act. Id. at 7.
120. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
121. Id. at 545. This statement is dicta as well. In Carlson, the Court merely upheld
Congress' ability to withhold bail prior to civil deportation proceedings for alien communists. Id. at 544-46.
122. See, e.g., Escandar v. Ferguson, 441 F. Supp. 53, 58 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Trimble v.
Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 484-85 (D.D.C. 1960); see also United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d
657, 659 (Butler, Circuit Justice 1926) (decided before Stack, but also holding that
eighth amendment confers an absolute right to bail); United States v. Fah Chung, 132 F.
109, 110 (S.D. Ga. 1904) (dictum to the effect that criminal defendants possess a right to
be admitted to bail in all cases).
123. The court also relied substantially on the scholarship of Professors Duker and
Meyer. See supra notes 6 & 114.
124. 430 A.2d at 1327-29. These documents included the Northwest Ordinance,
which was reenacted by the same Congress that adopted the Bill of Rights. Id. at 1329.
The court correctly rejected the implausible argument that the importation of the
English bail clause was an historical error. See Foote, supra note 114, at 984-87. Professor Foote maintained that George Mason, the lay draftsman of the eighth amendment,
failed to comprehend the limited legal effect of the English bail clause, but that the
Framers, nonetheless, intended the American bail clause to bind Congress. Id. This is
engaging historical speculation. As the Edwards court observed, however, the legislative
record concerning the bail clause contains but one sentence-and that sentence merely
comments upon the ambiguity of the word "excessive." I ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (J.
Gales ed. 1789) (statements of Rep. Livermore); see Tribe, supra note 6, at 398. The
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in England should, therefore, clarify the meaning of the American
bail clause.' 2 5 Parliament seems to have enacted the bail clause of
the English Bill of Rights only in response to abuses by the Crown
and the judiciary.' 2 6 Thus, the court concluded, the bail clause of
the eighth amendment simply prohibits the courts from abusing
their power by setting "excessive bail"; it does not restrict Congress' discretion to define the conditions on which a defendant is
12 7
entitled to bail.
In its historical analysis, the Edwards court failed to adequately
address the crucial distinction, between the British parliamentary
system and the American constitutional system. Unlike Parliament,
Congress possesses only limited powers. 128 Thus, the existence of
an unlimited power in Congress to define the scope of the people's
civil liberties is thoroughly inconsistent with the underlying theme
of the Bill of Rights. As Justice Black remarked:
The Eighth Amendment is in the American Bill of Rights
evidence, therefore, does not conclusively demonstrate either that the Framers intended
or that they did not intend the American bail clause to limit Congress' ability to withhold
bail. See 430 A.2d at 1329. Furthermore, George Mason's contributions notwithstanding, many attorneys were among the persons who considered, debated, and approved
the Bill of Rights.
125. See 430 A.2d at 1326-29.
126. Id. at 1327.
127. Id. at 1327-28. The vast majority of courts seem to have held that, at the very
least, the eighth amendment requires that bail not be denied unreasonably. See, e.g.,
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 569 (1952) (BurtonJ, dissenting); Hunt v. Roth, 648
F.2d 1148, 1164-65 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.
478 (1982) (per curiam); United States v. Beaman, 631 F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1980);
Finetti v. Harris, 609 F.2d 594, 599 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d
3, 5 & n.2 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); United States ex rel. Goodman v.
Kehl, 456 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1972); United States exrel. Covington v. Coparo, 297 F.
Supp. 203, 205-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States ex rel. Fink v. Heyd, 287 F. Supp. 716,
717-18 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895 (1969); cf.
United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984,997 (2d Cir. 1986) (the eighth amendment limits the breadth of Congress' authority to restrict the availability of bail); Atkins
v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 964 (1981) (due process
prohibits arbitrary denial of bail).
Given the legitimacy of Congress' findings concerning crimes committed by persons
released on bail, see S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 6 & n. 14, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3188-89, the Bail Reform Act would probably pass
such a rational basis test. Thus, the debate over the Act's constitutionality seems reducible to the claim that the right to bail is fundamental. See United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d
100, 112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986) (eighth amendment claim amounts
to an assertion that the Act deprives defendants of liberty without due process of law);
Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1331 (right to bail, although important, is not fundamental).
128. 430 A.2d at 1367 (Mack, J., dissenting); Tribe, supra note 6, at 400. In response
to this distinction, the Edwards majority simply reiterated its conclusion that the Framers
intended the bail clause only to bind the judiciary. 430 A.2d at 1330.
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of 1789, not the English Bill of Rights of 1689. And it is
well known that our Bill of Rights was written and adopted
to guarantee Americans greater freedom than had been enjoyed by their ancestors
who had been driven from Europe
29
by persecution.
Moreover, if Congress' power to define the conditions of bail
were indeed absolute, the bail clause might become surplusage, as
Congress could then conceivably withhold bail in every criminal
case.' 30 The constitutional bar against "excessive" bail, therefore,
clearly contemplates that, at least in some cases, Congress does not
possess an unlimited power to withhold bail.
C.

Schall v. Martin

In Schall v. Martin 131 the Supreme Court flatly upheld the constitutionality of preventive detention, although only in the juvenile
context. 3 2 Relying in part on Wolfish,' 3 3 the Court held that a New
York juvenile bail statute violated neither procedural nor substantive due process. 34
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist refined the approach he had first announced in Wofish. A restraint on liberty such
as preventive detention is regulatory rather than punitive only if it
serves a "legitimate and compelling" state purpose. 1 35 The Court
decided that crime prevention was such a purpose. 1 36 But Rehnquist imposed two additional conditions: (1) the governmental purpose must be "rationally assignable" to the restrictions imposed;
and (2) the restrictions must not be excessive in relation to the gov37
ernmental purpose. 1
129. Carlson 342 U.S. at 557 (Black, J., dissenting).
130. 430 A.2d at 1365 (Mack, J., dissenting). Congress might, however, achieve substantially the same result without entirely abolishing the statutory right to bail. By withholding bail in all but minor criminal cases, Congress could render the bail clause a
virtual nullity. Cf. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364 (1953) (questioning whether Congress,
in the exercise of its article III power to regulate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
might "except" from the Court's jurisdiction all but patent cases).
131. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
132. Id. at 281.
133. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See supra Section IV.A.
134. 467 U.S. at 256-57.
135. Id. at 264-68.
136. Id.
137. Id. This second tier is clearly the reincarnation of Wolfish. The flawed rational
basis test is embellished only slightly by Justice Rehnquist's assent to an additional inquiry into the excessiveness of the challenged restrictions. See supra notes 96-99 and
accompanying text.
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The Court applied these standards to the New York juvenile
bail law. It is important to note that in relation to each step in the
Court's analysis, the Bail Reform Act is distinguishable from the
New York statute. Thus, Schall will not be controlling precedent
when the Court considers the Salerno appeal. 3 ' The Schall Court
relied heavily on the state's interest in protecting wayward children
from the consequences of their own misconduct." 9 "The State,"
the Court remarked, "has a parenspatriae interest in preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child, '. . . which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial.' "140
The state interest at stake in Schall, therefore, was not simply crime
prevention.
In addition, the Court recognized that, because of the state's
parens patriae power, a juvenile's liberty interest is less significant
than that of an adult.' 4 ' The liberty interest of the child, while "undoubtedly substantial .... must be qualified by the recognition that
14 2
juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody."'
Thus, Schall does not support preventive detention of adult offenders. The Supreme Court has yet to hold, or even to suggest, that the
government's "legitimate and compelling" interest in crime prevention outweighs the liberty interests of competent adults.
The Court in Schall next considered whether preventive detention under the New York statute served a regulatory, rather than
punitive, purpose. Justice Rehnquist found it persuasive that every
state in the union and the District of Columbia had adopted legisla138. But see United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 394 (Sloviter, J., dissenting)
(observing that the Court is unlikely to make such a distinction).
139. 467 U.S. at 263-66. The Court largely deferred to the prior conclusions of the
New York Court of Appeals. Upholding the statute against an earlier challenge, the state
court had emphasized "'the desirability of protecting the juvenile from his own folly.' "
467 U.S. at 265 (quoting People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 688-89, 385
N.Y.S.2d 518, 521, 350 N.E.2d 906, 909 (1976)). The Court of Appeals had also recognized that, because of their immaturity, juveniles are less capable of self-restraint than
adults; hence, " 'there is a greater likelihood that ajuvenile charged with delinquency, if
released, will commit another criminal act than that an adult charged with crime will do
so. " 467 U.S. at 265-66 n.15 (quoting Wayburn, 39 N.Y.2d at 687-88, 385 N.Y.S.2d at
520-21, 350 N.E.2d at 908-09).
140. 467 U.S. at 263 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)). The
Court's recognition that juvenile proceedings are "fundamentally different" from adult
trials ought to be sufficient in itself to limit Schall's precedential effect in the area of
preventive detention of adult defendants.
14 1. Id. at 265. The Court concluded that a "juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's 'parenspatriae interest in preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child.'" Id. (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766).
142. Id.

398

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 46:378

tion that authorized preventive detention ofjuveniles, 1 4 3 and each
state court that had considered the constitutionality of these statutes
had found them valid. 1 4 4 Because of the uniform legislative and judicial approval of this practice, the Court concluded that preventive
detention "serves a legitimate regulatory purpose compatible with
demanded by the Due Process Clause in
the 'fundamental fairness'
14 5
juvenile proceedings."'
In contrast the Bail Reform Act is relatively unique. Although
several American jurisdictions currently authorize preventive deten14 6
tion of adult defendants, that measure is rarely, if ever, used.
Moreover, only the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Edwards, has considered the constitutionality of incarcerating adult defendants prior to trial solely on the grounds that they pose a danger
to the community. 147 There is, then, less than a uniform judgment
in favor of preventive detention of adult defendants.
Finally, because of the relatively mild conditions of confinement
under the New York act, the Schall Court found it easy to character48
ize preventive detention as regulatory, rather than punitive.
Those conditions, however, are dissimilar to the conditions of confinement that the Bail Reform Act prescribes.
The most fundamental difference between the statutes relates
to time. Under the New York statute, the maximum possible period
of detention was seventeen days. 149 The Bail Reform Act, however,
authorizes indefinite pretrial detention. 5 0 As ChiefJudge Feinberg
remarked at oral argument in the Melendez-Carrion case, "You don't
5 1
think there's a quantum leap from 17 days to two or three years?"' '
The Schall Court also concluded that the physical conditions of
detention under the New York scheme reflected a regulatory pur-

143. 467 U.S. at 266-68 & n.16. Several model acts also authorized preventive detention of juvenile offenders. Id. at 267 & n. 17.
144. Id. at 267-68.
145. Id. at 268.
146. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3188. Several model acts have also endorsed preventive detention
of adults. Id.
147. In United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1022 (1982), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a scheme for preventive
detention that Congress had enacted for the District in 1970. See supra Section IV.B.
148. 467 U.S. at 269-71.
149. Id. at 270.
150. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 999 (2d Cir. 1986); see supra
notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
151. Riley, supra note 62, at 32, col. 2.
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pose.' 5 2 Many children stayed at halfway houses, without locks or
bars.15 3 Even at "secure" facilities, children were placed in separate
dormitories according to age, size, and behavior; they wore street
clothes; and they could participate in educational and recreational
activities, as well as counseling sessions." 5 Only under "excepthe state incarcerate a juvenile defendtional circumstances" could
55
ant with adult offenders.'
Under the Bail Reform Act, pretrial detainees must be sepa56
rated from sentenced prisoners only "to the extent practicable." '
As the Second Circuit observed, this standard "will inevitably permit confinement of pretrial detainees with sentenced prisoners in
some circumstances.' 57 Furthermore, some adult detainees "have
been housed in secure facilities and confined to their cells for
twenty-three hours a day."' 5 8 Lastly, the conditions of adult pretrial
confinement can be extremely harsh. Subject to only the most limited judicial scrutiny, the warden can, for example, authorize body
each occasion on which they have
cavity searches of detainees after
1 59
physical contact with visitors.
D.

The Mental Impairment Cases

Several courts have held that a compelling state interest, such
as the prevention of crime, might outweigh the liberty interests even
of competent adults.' 60 Those courts, however, have relied on a
line of Supreme Court cases that concern detention or civil commitment for insane, incompetent, or mentally retarded persons. Under
these cases, the government may detain persons who are both dangerous and insane; 6 ' on the other hand, the Constitution prohibits
152. 467 U.S at 270.
153. Id. at 271.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 270.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
157. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 999 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986).
158. Id. at 999.
159. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979). See supra Section IV.A.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 548-49 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 112-13 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986); United
States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1450 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
161. For example, in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940),
the Supreme Court permitted civil commitment of "sexual psychopaths"-persons unable to control their sexual appetites. Id. at 275-77. In Greenwood v. United States, 350
U.S. 366 (1956), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that authorized indefinite pretrial detention of criminal defendants who were both dangerous and
mentally incompetent. Id. at 375; cf.Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (state
may not authorize indefinite pretrial detention of mentally incompetent defendants who
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pretrial detention of criminal defendants who are not dangerous,
but who are unable to stand trial because of mental
incompetence. 162
Plainly, none of these cases addresses the validity of governmental restraints on the liberty of competent, adult citizens. To
suggest, as one court has, that these cases provide at least "indirect
support" for preventive detention of competent adults

6

1

is merely

to concede that these cases are fundamentally distinguishable. Like
the juvenile offenders in Schall, persons who have been adjudged"6
to constitute a threat to society and who are not in control of their
rational faculties can claim only a diminished interest in personal
freedom. The Court has sanctioned the incarceration of this class of
persons precisely because they are unable to control their conduct.
Under the Bail Reform Act, however, mature citizens are incarcerated even though they are fully able to control their own conduct. 6 5 'The Korematsu case' 66 notwithstanding, the Supreme Court
has yet to decide whether any governmental interest is sufficiently
of mentally competent adults
compelling to warrant incarceration
16 7
prior to a finding of guilt.

are not dangerous). In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Court held that
the government may place persons in civil commitment only upon clear and convincing
evidence that they are both dangerous and insane. Id. at 433. Finally, in Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), the Court sanctioned indefinite post-trial detention of criminal defendants who have been found guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 366.
162. .Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). Unlike the federal statute at issue
in Greenwood, the Indiana statute did not premise detention on a finding of the defendant's dangerousness. 406 U.S. at 736.
163. United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 548-49 (1st Cir. 1986).
164. Each of the cases that allowed detention of dangerous, insane persons also stated
that, prior to an extended period of detention, the government must afford a hearing
that satisfies the demands of due process. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 363-66 (criminal trial);
Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-32 (civil proceeding in which government must present clear
and convincing evidence that person is both mentally ill and dangerous); Greenwood, 350
U.S. at 367-68 & n.1 (judicial determination of whether defendant is incompetent to
stand trial); Pearson, 309 U.S. at 275 (hearing before probate judge at which two medical
doctors were required to testify; defendant had the right to counsel and to call
witnesses).
165. Cf. Tribe, supra note 6, at 293 ("We know you can control your behavior, for we
are about to try you as a criminal, but we do not trust you to refrain from crime. How
could the accused possibly respond?").
166. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme Court upheld
the internment of thousands ofJapanese-Americans who had neither been convicted nor
even accused of any crime. See United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1004
(2d Cir. 1986).
167. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.15 (1979).
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V.

A.

THE SALERNO CASE

The Second Circuit

In United States v. Salerno 16' a divided panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Bail Reform
Act deprived detainees of liberty without substantive due process of
law.' 6 9 This decision, which the Supreme Court has decided to review'17 and seems likely to reverse, relied in large part upon Judge
Newman's opinion in a previous Second Circuit case, United States v.
Melendez-Carrion.17 ' The viability of Salerno, and perhaps of any challenge to the Act's constitutionality, therefore depends upon the
strength of Judge Newman's reasoning.
Judge Newman, who authored the opinion of the court, and
Chief Judge Feinberg, who wrote a concurring opinion, agreed that
the Act did not violate the eighth amendment; 172 that Congress
could have designed the Act as a valid regulatory measure; 17 and
that eight months of pretrial detention, imposed solely on the
grounds of dangerousness, would violate due process. 1 74 But they
differed as to whether preventive detention could ever be
75
constitutional.'
Chief Judge Feinberg contended that, at its outset, preventive
detention was a valid regulatory tool; with the passage of time, however, it might degenerate into punishment.' 76 Judge Newman concluded that Congress could "not constitutionally authorize pretrial
detention on grounds of dangerousnessfor any length of time as a regulatory measure."'' 7 7 His argument will strike a chord with those
who fear the consolidation of governmental power and who admire
the American form of government because of its respect for individ168. 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986).
169. Id. at 71-75.
170. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
171. 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986); see Salerno, 794 F.2d at 71-75. For a description of
the unique circumstances surrounding the Melendez-Carrionopinion, see supra notes 1826 and accompanying text.
172. 790 F.2d at 997-99.
173. Id. at 999-1000. In this regard, the approach presented supra Section IV.A is
analytically distinct from that which Newman has proposed; I have maintained that the
Act is not a valid regulatory measure under any circumstances. See supra notes 102-110
and accompanying text.
174. See 790 F.2d at 1000.
175. Id. at 1000.
176. Id. at 1007-09 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). Indeed, even among the courts that
have upheld the Bail Reform Act, many have taken this view. See supra note 78 and
authorities cited therein.
177. Id. at 1000.
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ual liberty: detention imposed in order to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is, or ought to be, contrary to a
fundamental tenet of the American system of criminal justice.
78
Judge Newman first attacked the assertion based on Schall1
that preventive detention of adults is a rational means of advancing
the compelling governmental interest of public safety:
The fallacy of using such a test can readily be seen from
consideration of preventive detention as applied to persons
not arrested for any offense. It cannot seriously be maintained that under our Constitution the Government could
jail people not accused of any crime simply because they
were thought likely to commit crimes in the future. Yet
such a police state approach would undoubtedly be a rational means of
advancing the compelling state interest in
79
public safety. 1
Newman then clearly established that his decision rested on the
ground of substantive, rather than procedural, due process:
Even if a statute provided that a person could be incarcerated for dangerousness only after a jury was persuaded that
his dangerousness had been established beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial surrounded with all of the procedural
guarantees applicable to determinations of guilt, the statute could not be upheld, no matter how brief the period of
detention. 1"0
Like Judge Weinstein in United States v. Colombo,""' Newman asserted
178. 467 U.S. 253 (1984). See supra Section IV.C.
179. 790 F.2d at 1000.
180. Id. at 1001.
181. 616 F. Supp. 780, 785 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985). Judge Weinstein, the trial court judge, ordered Colombo and his codefendants released from preventive detention. He conceded that Colombo, a notorious Mafia chieftain, remained
dangerous. See 616 F. Supp. at 788. It appeared, however, that 13 months to two years
were likely to pass before his trial could take place. Id. at 785. Judge Weinstein stated:
"Such a long period of preventive detention without a finding of guilt, based solely on
possible danger to the public, is 'anathema to American ideals of due process.' " Id.
(quoting R.B. MCNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 135
(1982)). The judge, one of the nation's foremost experts on the law of evidence, also
offered an analogy based on FED. R. EVID. 404, which generally prohibits introduction of
evidence of a defendant's bad acts in order to prove propensity for misconduct: "Our
criminal law has generally set its face against the inference prior to conviction of bad
man therefore bad act." 616 F. Supp. at 786.
Clearly seeking to avoid a constitutional confrontation, the Second Circuit reversed:
a unanimous panel held that a determination of the probable length of detention was
premature. 777 F.2d at 100-01. The appellate court did indicate, however, that the
passage of time might render detention punitive and hence unconstitutional. Id. at 101.
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that preventive detention ran counter to fundamental American
justice:
The system of criminal justice contemplated by the Due
Process Clause-indeed, by all of the criminal justice guarantees of the Bill of Rights-is a system of announcing in
statutes of adequate clarity what conduct is prohibited and
then invoking the penalties of the law against those who
have committed crimes. The liberty protected under that
system is premised on the accountability of free men and
women for what they have done, not for what they may do.
The Due Process Clause reflects the constitutional imperative that incarceration to protect society from criminals
may be accomplished only as punishment of those convicted for past crimes and not as regulation of those feared
82
likely to commit future crimes.1
From the general principle that criminal conduct requires a coincidence of mens rea and actus reus, it follows that society cannot
punish persons for evil thoughts alone.'
Similarly, society cannot
inflict further punishment on persons whose prison sentences have
expired, even if these persons are likely to commit criminal acts in
the future.' 8 4 Judge Newman further contends that the mere fact of
arrest-the determination that there is probable cause to believe a
defendant has committed a criminal offense-does not justify an inquiry into the defendant's propensity for criminal conduct.'8 5
Newman correctly conceded that an arrest can justify some regulatory curtailment of liberty. 186 Still he reasoned that detention of
competent adult defendants is regulatory only if it serves the integrity of the judicial process. 1 8 7 Detention imposed to ensure the defendant's presence at trial, or to protect witnesses and jurors, serves
the integrity of the judicial process by guaranteeing that a criminal
defendant will receive a fair trial. 18 On the other hand, detention
designed to protect society from predicted but unconsummated of182. 790 F.2d at 1001.
183. See id. at 1000.

184. This proposition also seems to follow from the requirement of a coincidence of
mens rea and actus reus. Thus, it is not important to decide whether, as a constitutional
matter, this principle is embodied in the due process clause, Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at
1001 (opinion of Newman, J.), or the double jeopardy clause, United States v. Salerno,
794 F.2d 64, 77 n.l (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 397
(1986).
185. 790 F.2d at 1001.
186. Id. at 1001-02; see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975).
187. 790 F.2d at 1002.
188. Id.; see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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fenses does not increase the likelihood of a fair trial. Accordingly,
8 9
such detention is not simply regulatory.1
The government argued that the earlier Supreme Court decision of Gerstein v. Pugh'9o endorsed prevention of future criminal
conduct as a legitimate justification for detaining defendants after
their arrest: "Once the suspect is in custody ...[t]here no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes
....
,
The Salerno court held that these loose words do not validate preventive detention. Gerstein stands for the principle that
states cannot detain defendants for an indefinite period of time
1 92
prior to a neutral magistrate's determination of probable cause.
It would be ironic, therefore, if Gerstein were to become the vehicle
93
for the legitimization of preventive detention.1
B.

The Supreme Court

One might well ask whether it is the Second Circuit, rather than
Congress, that has acted beyond its constitutional powers. After undertaking a thorough inquiry, Congress reasonably concluded that
the Bail Reform Act was constitutional. That conclusion is sincere
and resolutely held.' 9 4 Moreover, in the congressional debates, few
elected representatives seem to have expressed concern over the
Act's constitutionality, 95 and only the possibility of lengthy pretrial
detention sparked their concern.' 9 6
In addition, the courts have concluded almost uniformly that, at
least at its outset, preventive detention is constitutional. 19 7 Yet
these decisions may rest more upon judicial deference than legal
reasoning; given Congress' careful attention to the constitutional issues,19 8 and the steady growth of precedent that seems at first
glance to support the Act's constitutionality,' 9 9 perhaps some of
189. 790 F.2d at 1002.
190. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
191. Id. at 114.
192. Id.; United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 74 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 397

(1986).
193. Salerno, 794 F.2d at 74.

194. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3189-90.
195. See 130 CONG. REc. S938-47 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984).
196. Id. at S939-40 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (statements of Sen. Mitchell); id. at S944
(statements of Sen. Specter).

197. See supra note 78 and authorities cited therein.
198. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-10, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3189-92.
199. See supra Section IV.
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these courts have simply avoided a direct constitutional confrontation. In fact, a number of courts have expressly dodged the issue of
the Act's constitutionality.2 0 0 Furthermore, the position of the four
circuits that have upheld the Act-that detention, although initially
regulatory, may at some unspecified point degenerate into punishment-plainly reflects their attempt to defer the ultimate decision. 2 ° ' Preventive detention appears to have troubled the courts
more than it troubled Congress.
This should not come as a surprise. The courts, not Congress,
must confront expanding dockets of complex criminal cases, the
very type of cases that demonstrate the unwisdom of Congress' reli20 2
ance on the time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.
More important, because of its relative insulation from political
pressures, the federal judiciary has traditionally vindicated the
rights of those victimized by "the occasional tyrannies of governing
majorities. ' 20 3 Few would rush to defend the Mafia overlord 20 4 or
the violent opponent of the American presence in Puerto Rico. 20 5 It
is essential to recall, however, that in many of the crucial decisions
outlining the right to bail, the defendants were unpopular opponents of the government. 20 6 If the courts should abandon Salerno
200. See, e.g., United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 100-01 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d
887, 889 n.8 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir.
1985). I do not mean to suggest that it is proper for a court to eschew a narrow, statutory ground for its decision in order to reach a constitutional question.
201. See United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 546-48 (1st Cir. 1986); United States
v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 768 & n.14 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Accetturo, 783 U.S.
383, 388 (3d Cir. 1986). In a two paragraph per curiam decision, the Eleventh Circuit
summarily declared the Act constitutional. United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 1102,
1103 (11 th Cir. 1986). This statement may well be dicta, since the court seemed already
to have disposed of the defendant's claims strictly on statutory grounds. Id. Even if the
statement is not dicta, from the court's citation to the Seventh Circuit's Portes decision
one may infer some solicitude for the plight of defendants indefinitely detained. Id.
202. See generally United States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 780, 787 (E.D.N.Y.), revd,
777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985) (detailing why, from the perspective of a federal trial court
judge, Congress' reliance on the Speedy Trial Act was "unrealistic").
203. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
204. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 397
(1986).
205. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986). "Because the
defendants whose liberties are most affected are those who are unlikely to command
public sympathy or attention, it is unlikely there will be action from Congress, which
already has declined several opportunities to remedy the situation." United States v.
Accetturo, 783 F.2d 383, 395-96 (3d Cir. 1986) (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
206. See, e.g., Sellers v. United States, 89 S.Ct. 36 (Black, Circuit Justice 1968); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Williamson v.
United States, 184 F.2d 280 (Jackson, Circuit Justice 1950).
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or Melendez-Carrion, then, in the words of Justice Jackson, they
"also cast aside protections for the liberties of more worthy" defendants-the protections of "critics who may be in opposition to
20 7
the government of some future day."1
In American constitutional history, few issues have proved as
divisive as that of substantive due process-the Court's reservation
of the power to refer to natural law principles in order to invalidate
popularly enacted legislation. As exercises in substantive due process, the Salerno and Melendez-Carrion decisions yield no limiting
principle: the Second Circuit did not, and perhaps cannot, delineate the boundaries of its powers of review. 20 8 This is a situation
fraught with difficulties, both political and jurisprudential. Even
greater difficulties would arise, though, were the judiciary to abdicate its power to define and to protect fundamental liberties.
The Supreme Court will hear the Salerno appeal this term. To
affirm the judgment, the Court need not adopt the novel reasoning
ofJudge Newman.20 9 In Bell v. Wolfish 21 0 the Court itself announced
a principle grounded in substantive due process: that the govern21
ment may not inflict punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt. '
Under that principle, preventive detention does constitute punishment. 2 12 Alternatively, the Court might hold that the bail clause
prohibits Congress from establishing a regime of preventive detention,213 or that the liberty interests of competent adults are so important that even the compelling governmental interest in public
safety is insufficient to warrant the imposition of preventive
detention.21 4
At the very least, the Court has a responsibility to address the
Act's toleration of indefinite periods of pretrial detention. 2 5 The
Court should agree with the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits that
even if detention is constitutional at its outset, at some point it will
degenerate into punishment and become unconstitutional.21 6 Un207. Williamson, 184 F.2d at 284.
208. Compare the positivist-incorporationist method of constitutional exegesis that
Justice Black advocated. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965) (Black,J.,
dissenting).
209. In fact, the Court need not issue a decision at all, since Salerno's conviction has
rendered the case technically moot. See supra note 32.
210. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See supra Section IV.A.
211. 441 U.S. at 535.
212. See supra Section IV.A.
213. See supra Section IV.B.
214. See supra Sections IV.B-C.
215. See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
216. See United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 546-48 (lst Cir. 1986); United States
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fortunately, this issue will not be directly before the Justices: the
Salerno defendants had been in detention for only three months
when the Second Circuit ordered their release.2 1 7 Nevertheless, it is
incumbent upon the Court to reach this question, not only to provide guidance, but also to ensure that the federal judiciary continues
to fulfill the role it has traditionally occupied-that of the guardian
of human rights.21 s
KEVIN

F.

ARTHUR

v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 768 & n.14 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d
383, 388 (3d Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 78 (2d Cir.)
(Feinberg, C.J., dissenting), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986); United States v.
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1007-09 (2d Cir. 1986) (Feinberg, C.J., concurring)
(asserting in concurrence and dissent that detention that is constitutional at its outset
may become unconstitutional with the passage of time).
217. 794 F.2d at 79 (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting).
218. I do not mean to suggest that, as a matter of course, courts should decide unnecessary issues, constitutional or otherwise.

